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Abstract 
Proponents recommend Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a solution to a trifold crisis of work, wage and 
social democracy. Synthesising Marxian form analysis with Marxist-feminist social reproduction theory, 
this paper suggests that these crises relate to historically-specific capitalist social forms: labour, money, 
and the state. These separate but interlocking crises of social form are temporary and contingent 
expressions of an underlying, permanent crisis of social reproduction. Mistaking the pervasive crisis of 
social reproduction in its totality for a temporary or contingent trifold crisis of work, wage or social 
democracy, UBI proposals seek to solve it by moving through the same social forms through which they 
take effect, rather than confronting the social relations that constitute their antagonistic undertow and 
generate the crisis of social reproduction. The paper considers two other solutions proposed to handle 
the deeper-rooted crisis with which UBI grapples: Universal Basic Services (UBS) and Universal Basic 
Infrastructure (UBIS) Both propose non-monetary ways past the impasses of the UBI, addressing much 
more directly the constrained basis of individual and collective reproduction that characterises capitalist 
social relations. But they retain a link with capitalist social forms of money and state that may serve to 
close rather than open the path to real alternatives. The paper concludes that the contradictions these 
‘abstract universals’ touch upon are best mediated through more bottom-up and struggle-based 
‘concrete universals’ that address the manifold crises of work, wage and social democracy that 
undergird them. Such alternatives would leave open dynamic tensions around work and welfare in 
contemporary capitalism without promise of their incomplete resolution in the name of a false 
universality unattainable in a world characterised by antagonism, domination and crisis. 
 
1. Introduction 
What do theories of social form and social reproduction tell us about contemporary left 
social policy? Marxian and Marxist-feminist literatures on social form and social 
reproduction typically adopt a critical distance from reformist policies to mitigate and 
mediate in practice the contradictions each confront in theory. As Marxian form 
analysis and Marxist-feminist social reproduction theory gain increasing uptake among 
the critical scholarly community, this paper crafts a novel synthesis of the two in 
application to the universalising policy proposals that today populate left policymaking 
in an age where even the right has its ‘Universal Credit’: the Universal Basic Income 
(UBI), and two alternatives posed to it, Universal Basic Services and Universal Basic 
Infrastructure.  
This array of options slots in within a wider policymaker interest in ‘universal’ 
solutions to the intractable contradictions of contemporary work, wage and welfare. 
Notably, the rollout of Universal Credit is the most notorious example of what happens 
when a premature claim to universality meets the stratified and complex character 
of our world. Occurring so far in fits and starts, its replacement of means-tested 
benefits and tax credits purported to decomplexify welfare benefits in response to a 
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perceived crisis of worklessness in the United Kingdom in the wake of the Great 
Recession (Pantazis 2016, Wiggan 2012). However, it has drawn criticism for the 
unequal gender impacts of its household structure (Cain 2016), its punitive sanctions 
regime (Dukelow and Kennett 2018), exclusionary forms of conditionality that set 
minimum income floors unattainable by the precarious and self-employed (Fletcher 
and Wright 2018), and its incentivisation of a competitive labour market of low-paid 
jobs (Hirsch 2017). The universality of the UC hence conceals the particularity of its ill 
effects on those in and out of work. 
But what forms of universality project a better path? And are 
some ‘universals’ better than others?  This paper sets out to determine between the 
way problems and their solutions are posed along the lines of what, loosely 
paraphrasing Hegel, we might call ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ universals (Baumann 
2011).   
The Universal Basic Income (UBI) is ‘an unconditional regular payment to all 
citizens’ (Sage 2018:17-18). It is an idea with increasing uptake on the left (Pearce 
2015; Pitts 2018), including in the UK Labour Party, which has committed to including 
a pilot of the measure in its next manifesto (Pitts and Dinerstein 2017). Centre-left 
policymakers and think-tanks in the UK are engaged in modelling exercises around its 
implementation (Harrop 2016; Painter and Thoung 2016; Reed and Lansley 2016). In 
the UK, the idea has recently attracted support from the Trades Union Congress (TUC) 
(Martinelli 2017:23). 
Within a gathering political consensus around the necessity of some step 
change in welfare provision to address technological and economic changes afoot in 
the labour market and beyond, left proposals for a UBI range from relatively limited 
financial support to effectively top up wages and replace or simplify certain benefits, 
to a full-blown liveable income capable of replacing the wage entirely. Fiscal limitations 
and knotty issues of impact and implementation accompany halfway-house schemes 
(Harrop and Tait 2017; Reed and Lansley 2016; Painter and Thoung 2016). Hence, it 
is the liveable UBI that constitutes the present frontier of left thinking on the topic, and 
the version of the UBI that looms largest in the popular and policymaker imaginary of 
widespread technological unemployment in the wake of the so-called ‘rise of the 
machines’ (Spencer 2017, 2018; Thompson and Briken 2017). Indeed, for proponents 
on the left, the UBI has gained a foothold partly through pop-radical ideas around post-
workerism, post-capitalism, accelerationism and so-called 'luxury communism' 
(Mason 2015a; Srnicek and Williams 2015; Bastani 2019; cf. Pitts 2018). The liveable 
UBI is therefore put forward as one of the key pieces of the ‘postcapitalist’ puzzle, 
purporting to remedy the social fallout following futurist fantasies of automating work 
away.  
Evaluating the problems and possible solutions posed in contemporary UK left 
policy thinking along these axes, this paper builds on previous work (Dinerstein and 
Pitts 2018; Pitts, Lombardozzi and Warner 2017a, 2017b; Pitts and Dinerstein 2017; 
Pitts 2018) to subject to scrutiny the ‘problem representations’ (Bacchi and Beasley 
2002) active in proposals for UBI, and the degree to which the latter poses a solution 
to the deeper-lying factors underpinning them. We examine how the UBI is (mis-
)represented as a solution to a series of interlocking problems, represented in a trifold 
crisis. First, a crisis of work sparked by flexibilization and automation. Second, a crisis 
of the wage, generated by the severed link between the wage and subsistence and 
simultaneous cutbacks in the welfare state. And third, related to each, a crisis of social 
democracy, which sees traditional parties of the left lose the legitimacy they once 
derived from an identifiable labour interest and the political and financial cover to enact 
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programmes of social protection under the name of the welfare state. Using Marxian 
form analysis derived from the ‘critique of political economy as a critical social theory’ 
that unites the New Reading of Marx with Open Marxism (e.g. Bonefeld 2016a; 
Charnock 2010; Dinerstein 2012; O’Kane 2018; Pitts 2015) we suggest that these 
crises relate to historically-specific capitalist social forms: for work, labour; for wage, 
money; and for social democracy, the state itself.  
Synthesising this critical Marxist focus on social form with Marxist-feminist 
social reproduction theory (Bhattacharya 2017, Federici 2019, Mezzadri 2019, 
henceforth SRT), we then argue that these seemingly separate but interlocking crises 
are all temporary or contingent expressions of an underlying, more permanent crisis 
of social reproduction. Many presentations of the ‘crisis of social reproduction’ or ‘crisis 
of care’ (Caffentzis 2002; Fraser 2016) identify it as something sparked by conditions 
and circumstances specific to the present, relating largely to a discrete, self-contained 
and typically gendered and racialized set of activities that rest upon the exploitation of 
the paid and unpaid labour of women, migrants and people of colour (see England 
2005, Glenn 1992, Perrons 2009). Whilst acknowledging these conditions and the 
gendered and racialised social relations that characterise them, here we take a 
macroscopic view of social reproduction that moves from the local instantiation of 
these dynamics to the generalised totality within which they unfold. 
This wide-lens focus reflects how within SRT there is a subtle distinction 
between, on the one hand, conceptualisations that locate ‘the domain where lives are 
sustained and reproduced’ (Zechner and Hansen 2015) within a narrower frame of 
reference relating to the domestic sphere and the gender division of paid and unpaid 
labour around which it is organised, including the exploitation of migrants and people 
of colour within these dynamics (e.g. Fraser 2014, 2016, Leonard and Fraser 2016), 
and, on the other, conceptualisations that stress instead social reproduction as the 
totality of relationships within which life and society themselves are generated and 
reproduced, and which therefore brings in moments outside both the home and the 
workplace such as the state and other institutions (e.g. Bhattacharya 2015, 2018).  
There is no necessary opposition between the two spins on SRT. Indeed,the 
second progressively builds from a foundation in the former. In this paper, = we use 
social reproduction as the totality within which human life itself proceeds. This directs 
our focus towards a more permanent and pervasive state of affairs whereby social 
reproduction in its capitalist character is always contradictory and crisis-ridden to its 
very core. The crisis therefore concerns the totality of the social reproduction of 
capitalist society as a whole, a set of antagonistic social relations mediated in the 
social also forms of labour, money and state, the contemporary crises of which the 
UBI seeks to tackle partly by means of those self-same social forms. This position 
within SRT implies that the crisis of social reproduction stands not for the 
reconfiguration of how of a finite group of actors to performs a finite set of practices, 
but rather represents a crisis in the totality of social reproduction as not only the 
reproduction of human life in its commodified mode of existence as labour power, but 
simultaneously the reproduction of capitalist society and capitalist social relations tout 
court.  
From this perspective, the way that proposals for a UBI are framed to respond 
to certain ‘problem representations’ typically mistakes the pervasive crisis of social 
reproduction as a temporary or contingent crisis of work, wage or social democracy. 
But by focusing on the social forms for which these stand in – labour, money and the 
state – we can recalibrate our ‘problem representations’ with reference to the social 
relations of which these forms are the expression. Whilst the discussion centres on 
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the UK, this approach recognises how the organisation of work, the role of the state, 
dynamics of social reproduction and debates on forms of universal welfare provision 
in settings such as the UK are shaped and enabled by configurations of global 
production and international division of labour. 
Deploying a distinction between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ universals (Baumann 
2011), of which proposals like the UBI and the Universal Credit present two examples, 
in the final section of the paper we consider two other solutions proposed to handle 
the deeper-rooted crisis with which UBI grapples: Universal Basic Services (Social 
Prosperity Network 2017) and Universal Basic Infrastructure (Industrial Strategy 
Commission 2017). Whilst these confer some benefits over UBI, we conclude that 
neither truly address a crisis in the totality of social reproduction that stands behind 
the apparent but ultimately contingent trifold crisis of work, wage and social democracy 
many conceptions of the UBI make claims to confront. This is because they, too, seek 
to solve them by only touching upon or moving through the same social forms through 
which they take effect, rather than working within the contradictions of the social 
relations that constitute their antagonistic undertow, and thus intervening, through 
struggle, on the preconditions where the crisis of social reproduction is determined. 
These social relations concern separation from the independent individual or collective 
means to reproduce the conditions of life for oneself and others; which itself concerns 
the character of capitalist property, the distribution of the means of production and the 
constrained conditions of production and consumption this distribution implies. In this 
respect, we end by considering the extent to which more conventional forms of labour 
struggle present a surer footing on which to confront the crisis of social reproduction 
and the social forms through which it is mediated. 
 
2. Problem representations and the critique of political economy 
In evaluating the UBI and its alternatives we critically employ the ‘What’s the Problem 
Represented to be?’ (WPR) approach (Bacchi and Beasley 2002). The WPR approach 
‘focuses on policy prescriptions and uses them as a way to identify issues that are 
represented to be problematic’ (Bacchi and Beasley 2002:331). The method ‘works [] 
backwards from concrete policy proposals to reveal how problems are represented 
within them’ (Stonehouse et al 2015:399), and ‘the assumptions that precede this 
representation’ (Flacks 2018:6). These ‘problem representations’ in turn ‘shape the 
scope of responses that are considered possible’ (Stonehouse et al 2015:399). In this 
way ‘policies and proposals actually constitute or produce those problems that they 
are ostensibly supposed to resolve’ (Flacks 2018:6), bearing real-world implications 
for how policies create and confront certain social conditions. By posing UBI as a 
solution to the series of contingent crises identified above, proponents trade in problem 
representations that place a certain theoretical and political stress on resolving 
contradictions other representations – namely the critical Marxism deployed here – 
conceptualise as more intractable and deep-seated, and from which flow different 
practical responses. 
Thus, in viewing proposals for the UBI based upon the problems they represent 
to be the case, we will apply the WPR approach critically insofar as we follow the 
critical theory tradition in seeing the world not simply as discursive and conceptual, but 
rather as organised around a conceptuality that conceals a non-conceptuality of lived 
material life based in subsistence and brute survival (Adorno 1973; Bonefeld 2014). 
Whilst it may proceed through ‘supersensible’ relationships, ideas and things, the 
conceptual apparatus through which the world is comprehended rests in 
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our relationship with ‘sensuous things’ (Bonefeld 2016b:72). Social and economic 
categories may be mystificatory and discursive, but for us it remains the case that ‘[t]he 
actual relations of life are the non-conceptual premise of the economic categories’ that 
constitute the 'supersensibility' through which the material world is met. Focusing, on 
one hand, on the continuing abstract forms of social mediation and domination of 
capitalist society, and, on the other, their concrete ‘non-conceptuality’ in continuing 
modes of practice and coercion, we draw in this endeavour on the New Reading of 
Marx and Open Marxism (e.g. Heinrich 2012; Bonefeld 2014).  
This strand of critical Marxism understands Marx’s critique of political economy 
(1976) and value theory (1978) not as presenting an alternative economics reducible 
only to material affairs but rather as a critical theory of capitalist society capable of 
grasping their mediation through ‘non-empirical’ conceptual forms (Bellofiore and 
Riva, 2015). Inspired by the readings of Marx given in the work of Rubin (1972, 1978), 
Reichelt (2005) and Backhaus (1980), this works from a careful reinterpretation of 
Marx’s written output inflected with Frankfurt School social theory derived from the 
work of Adorno, under whom many of the tradition’s earliest exponents studied 
(Bellofiore and Riva 2015). Together they present ‘a Marxism stripped of dogmatic 
certainties and naturalistic conceptions of society’ (Bonefeld 2014:41-2), radically 
open to a range of theoretical and empirical applications through an expansive 
understanding of the constitution of abstract social forms in continuing concrete forms 
of human practice and domination. 
The ‘critique of political economy as a critical theory of society’ rests on what 
Bonefeld (2014, 2016a, 2016b) calls ‘the negative dialectics of economic objectivity’- 
or in other words the demystification of the social and economic categories by which 
humans are dominated and, contradictorily, on which they depend in capitalist society. 
According to Adorno (1973: 11), dialectics is the ‘ontology of the wrong state of things’. 
It decodes the appearance of a world wherein things assume ‘modes of existence’ 
(Gunn 1987) through the forms in which they are socially mediated – forms like those 
encountered here: labour, money, the state. Negative dialectics critically decodes a 
reality in which these forms, as results of human practice, pose themselves above 
and against those from whose practice they spring but who subsist through them 
nonetheless. This process of decoding centres on what Bonefeld (2014) calls the ‘ad 
hominem critique of political economy’. It is ‘ad hominem’ insofar as it deals in the 
antagonistic material conditions of constrained reproduction in which capitalist society 
itself is historically and continually constituted, but which are mediated through 
apparently objective social and economic forms. The ad hominem critique assesses 
these categories with reference to the contradictions they both conceal and carry 
over.  
The ‘incomprehensible economic forces’ and social forms that rule over 
subjects in capitalist society by means of the assertion of their apparent objectivity, 
Bonefeld suggests (2016b:65-66), rest in and can be explained through human 
practice. These forms abstract from lived experience, but they are also a mode of 
existence through which the latter proceeds. In this way, they represent an ‘inverted 
and perverted world of definite social relations’ rooted in everyday life and, crucially, 
the social reproduction of humans as labour-power. In decoding this, Bonefeld 
suggests, negative dialectics opens out upon political questions about the delineation 
of the good and right life in a wrong world. 
The critique of political economy as a critical social theory, and the negative 
dialectics of economic objectivity on which it centres, helps anchor a critical Marxist 
understanding of the limits of UBI. It brings to light why UBI represents and reinforces 
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modes of existence which contain and do not address the contradictions of social 
reproduction in contemporary capitalism. We shine a light upon the social relations the 
social forms of labour, money and state sublate and express in their crises. Whereas 
the WPR approach suggests that the world revolves around discourse and concepts, 
for our approach discourse and concepts conceal real-lived material relationships 
which ultimately produce problems in our capacity to address their specific character. 
 
3. Social reproduction and social form 
Social reproduction is ‘the domain where lives are sustained and reproduced’ (Zechner 
and Hansen 2015). As Fraser writes (2014), whereas Marx ‘looked behind the sphere 
of exchange, into the ‘hidden abode’ of production, in order to discover capitalism’s 
secrets’, it is also necessary to ‘seek production’s conditions of possibility behind that 
sphere’. These, broadly, are also the ‘conditions of possibility of labour-power’ 
(Ferguson and McNally 2015). Namely: why do we have to work, and what keeps us 
working? According to Denning (2010), capitalist social relations begin ‘not with the 
offer of work, but with the imperative to earn a living’. All talk of work is moot without 
recognition that much must happen, logically and historically, to make the society of 
work possible in the first place. Workers must first be deprived of the independent 
individual and collective means to reproduce the means of living, through 
dispossession, colonialism and enclosure (De Angelis, 2004). This sets them, as Marx 
(1976:272) suggested, doubly free: free of any fixed feudal ties and the stability that 
attended them, and free to dispense of their labour under the formally free contractual 
relationships of liberal equality before the law. This dual form of dispossession 
whereby workers possess no commodity to sell but their capacity to labour, reinforced 
by the generation of a relative surplus population, ensures the sale of this labour-
power by means of the contractual relationship between employee and employer, and 
seals the continuity of the economic relations that both support and are constituted in 
and through it (Midnight Notes Collective, 2008; Federici and Linebaugh, 2018). But 
in order to be ready for market, this capacity must be reproduced, and with it the 
human being, who exists as nothing other than the sole commodity it has to its name: 
labour-power, the selling of which is the labourer’s umbilical cord with life itself.  
Whilst the concept of social reproduction suggests a somewhat functionalist 
argument about capitalist society, the concept implies a dialectic undertow that 
undermines any attempt to present it as subject to an ideal state of functioning. The 
antagonistic social constitution of labour-power as a commodity in the separation of 
humans from the independent means of subsistence, and the constrained conditions 
this sets for the reproduction of that labour-power, grant social reproduction in 
capitalist society a constantly conflictual and unstable character. But the popularity of 
the concept of social reproduction has been accompanied by a tendency to view it not 
as a contradictory totality of social relations in a state of constant crisis but rather as a 
set of social practices characterized at the present time by a condition of contingent 
crisis associated with the trifold crises of work, wage and state identified above. The 
focus on the circumstantial aspects of the crisis of social reproduction identify in the 
latter a problem specific only to the present, by way of solution to which some might 
suggest proposals such as the provision of free money by the state in order to support 
a workless world. Hence the ‘problem representation’ moves through the same social 
forms in which the true ‘problem’ inheres, but cannot provide a means to permanently 
resolve them. The theoretical and discursive construction of the problem thus conceals 
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a material contradiction which offers no way to comprehend or confront the root of the 
problem. 
What helps to illuminate the true character of the crisis of social reproduction is 
precisely the study of social form found in the revisionist approaches to the work of 
Marx introduced in Section 2. Drawing on Hegelian dialectics – specifically in the guise 
of the aforementioned ‘negative dialectics’ of Adorno (1973) – this suggests that the 
unfolding of the value form as presented in Marx’s Capital (1976, 1978; Rubin 1978) 
is not simply a logical derivation but a historical process based in the forceful 
dispossession and separation of individuals from the means of reproducing their 
conditions of living in order to create a class of wage labourers (Bonefeld 2014). As 
such, the value-form contains within it this ‘non-conceptuality’ of real-lived and 
antagonistic social relations. In this respect, the analysis of social forms like money, 
labour and the state is able to open out upon the material undergirding of these forms 
in lived experience and practice, of which they are the perverse and alienated 
outcome. Thus, ‘[d]omination in capitalism…is rooted in quasi-objective structures of 
compulsion constituted by determinate modes of practice, expressed by the categories 
of commodity and capital’ (Postone and Brennan 2009:316).  
From this perspective, Marx begins Capital with the commodity and goes on to 
‘elucidate [] a development that cannot simply be called economic, but rather is really 
the development of the commodity form as it moves’, a development that takes in 
society as a whole and rests on the positing of successive forms which mediate the 
contradictions inherent in a prior form which in turn become the content of the next 
(Postone and Brennan, 2009:313). As such, Marx begins from the form assumed by 
a set of social relations he progressively unveils. The chapter on primitive 
accumulation, in which Marx unfolds the historical constitution of the abstract 
categories covered in early chapters, does not arrive until the very end of the book. As 
Heinrich writes, history ‘does not precede the theoretical development, but rather 
follow[s] from it’, and Marx uses this presentation to show that ‘the separation of 
immediate producers from the means of production is the central historical 
precondition of the capitalist mode of production’ (Heinrich, forthcoming). For this 
tradition of critical Marxism, the analysis of social forms opens out upon a critical 
confrontation with the constitutive social relations these express. 
For scholars of social form the central ‘expository motive’ of Marx’s value theory 
is the crucial question ‘why this content assumes that form’ (Backhaus 1980:101). The 
social form tradition generalises from Marx’s presentation of the value-form in capital 
a wider understanding of form: just as behind the apparent ‘non-empirical reality’ of 
value lie antagonistic social relations that have a real-life efficacy mediated in abstract 
social forms, so too can the same be said for other social forms historically specific to 
capitalist society, such as labour, money and the state. When we remark that labour, 
money and the state mediate social relations in capitalist society we mean that a 
‘mediation’, in this instance, constitutes the relation between things via another 
‘intermediate’ thing, in the same way, as in Gunn’s apt simile, ‘a rope linking two 
climbers is constitutive of the relation in which they stand’ (1987:57). The thing that 
mediates is the mode of existence of that which it mediates- in other words, its form 
(1987:58). 
This approach has been used by various scholars employing the critique of 
political economy as a critical theory of society to elucidate the formal characteristics 
of labour, money and the state. Postone (1993) understands labour as a mediating 
form which connects individuals through their private labour with the social world of 
things in a world where humans are separated from the individual and collective 
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means to produce and acquire the things they need to live. As such it mediates the 
central contradiction through which capitalist society is constituted. Workers can do no 
more than sell their labour-power in exchange for a wage.  
As a waged activity, labour is therefore itself a commodified abstract mediation 
posed between diverse things by means of monetary exchange (Bonefeld 2010). This 
in turn rests on money as a form of mediation, ‘as the most abstract form of capitalist 
property and so as the supreme social power through which social reproduction is 
subordinated to the power of capital’ (Clarke 1988a:13-14).  With regard to this socially 
mediatory function of money in capitalism, the work of Sohn-Rethel (1978) constructs 
a vital continuity between Frankfurt School critical theory and the critical Marxist 
scholars that follow, centring on the ‘social synthesis’ constructed by money through 
the exchange of all things for all other things, against the contradictory foundation of 
their specificity and heterogeneity. In recent work, Lotz (2014) takes Sohn-Rethel’s 
insights forward to understand how money constructs a ‘capitalist schema’ through 
which the chaos of reality is rendered comprehensible in a world where things are 
accessible in the form of commodities.  
Finally, there is a rich strand of critical Marxism (Bonefeld 1987, 1993; Clarke 
1988a, 1988b, 1992; Holloway 1994; Holloway and Piccioto 1977) that elaborates from 
Marx’s work a form analysis of the state as itself a form assumed by the antagonistic 
class relations that constitute capitalist society. Hence the state is not a neutral 
instrument that can wielded by this party or that independently of the reproduction of 
capitalist society, but the political form of the social relation of capital (Dinerstein and 
Pitts 2018). It may ‘contain the political impact of th[e] contradictions’ of that social 
relation (Clarke 1992:136), but like labour and money acts as a mean for their 
reproduction along with the ‘domination’ they imply (Holloway and Piccioto 1977). 
These social forms represent modes of existence that mediate and thus carry 
over in a new guise the constrained underlying conditions of social reproduction 
specific to capitalist society. Any policy ‘solution’ to problems in the latter that touches 
only upon the forms of mediation through which they appear therefore cannot get to 
grips with the real cause of the misery it seeks to confront. Labour (work), money 
(wage) and state are the forms assumed by these social relations at different stages 
and levels of capitalist reproduction, and the crises in them are the formal appearances 
of what is in fact a single crisis in those antagonistic and contradictory social relations. 
They mediate the structural antagonisms and contradictions in such a way as to 
assimilate them, both negating them and carrying them over in a new guise. As such 
the underlying instability, subject to struggle and crisis, remains. It is this that is 
expressed in a constant, and not merely contingent, crisis of social reproduction in a 
society where, deprived of the independent individual or collective means to reproduce 
oneself and others, humans must struggle against constrained conditions of 
production and consumption to survive. 
The provision of money to solve the crisis of wage, and the intervention of the 
state to solve a crisis of social democracy propose to deploy a form of mediation 
assumed by the antagonistic and contradictory social relations that characterise 
capitalist society to solve a contingent crisis that is only the formal mediation through 
which the more permanent and pervasive crisis appears. This crisis sits at the level of 
those self-same social relations left untouched by a liveable UBI. To address the crisis 
we must proceed not only through those forms of mediation but against, beyond and 
despite them to confront head-on the social relations of separation, dispossession, 
distribution and property that they mediate and which lie at the crux of the represented 
‘problems’ proponents of the UBI set out to solve.  
 9 
 
Thus, what appears simply as a crisis of work, wage and social democracy in 
fact reflects a deeper and more pervasive crisis of social reproduction. These three 
are the social forms that mediate the antagonistic and contradictory struggle to survive 
in capitalist society. Combined with such a ‘social form’ perspective, social 
reproduction theory expands the theoretical understanding of the under-investigated 
intertwined relationship between productive and reproductive work which reproduces 
social inequality and hampers wellbeing. But it also poses a challenge to proposals for 
a UBI that claim to address the trifold crisis identified above without truly getting to 
grips with their antagonistic constitution in the totality of social reproduction. Hence, in 
debates over ‘universal’ policy alternatives such as the UBI, closer attention needs to 
be posed to the holistic understanding of those dimensions made possible by a focus 
on social reproduction.  
This becomes especially clear, we suggest in the next section, in how they 
centre on work alone at the expense of the totality of social reproduction within which 
it is imbricated. Meanwhile, many of the main criticisms of the UBI similarly place a 
singular focus on work at the expense of the wider nexus of forms and relations on 
which it rests. In the debate about the UBI and its alternatives, powerful underlying 
forces relating to the societal crisis of social reproduction are treated as givens without 
social and historical foundation. By reifying capitalist social relations in their separate 
components, such analyses too frequently address only individual aspects of crises, 
without grasping their interrelation at the level of the totality of the system as a whole. 
 
4. Social policy: Abstract and concrete universals 
The prehistory of the present basic income debate on the left is a long one (e.g. Jäger 
2018, Zamora 2017), but in its contemporary left form the proposal owes much to the 
work of scholars like Andre Gorz in the 1980s (Gorz 1989; Toscano 2014). The UBI 
acquires the character of ‘a universalist right which will stimulate diverse and 
particularistic communal projects and associations’ and ‘as a means of sharing out the 
common good in a more equitable fashion’ (Hughes 1996:30). By ‘provid[ing] lifelong 
security’, advocates propose, UBI would ‘allow individuals real choices as to priorities’ 
between earning more and having more time – but, importantly, ‘without the threat of 
penury and indignity’ (Ginn 2012:713). In opening up the options for different uses of 
time, proponents contend, the UBI ‘implicitly values forms of contribution to society 
other than paid work, including caring and volunteering’ (Leime and Street 2017:479). 
For some adherents, this is bound up in a philosophical appeal to a principle of 
‘freedom as autonomy’ (Alfageme et al 2012:698).  
A recent example of this line of argumentation (Sage 2018:3) contends that the 
‘damage of unemployment’ owes not to a lack of work but rather the negative effect 
on wellbeing produced by the way in which the work ethic compels the unemployed to 
‘conform to a powerful social norm’ based on the belief that ‘work yields status, identity, 
respect and human worth’. Sage’s solution to the deleterious effect of these social 
norms upon the wellbeing of the unemployed is the proposal of policies to weaken the 
importance paid work has to human identity: ‘to transform how employment is a 
signifier of status and unemployment a signifier of shame’, for which the ‘starting point 
[…] is to consider social policy reforms that change people’s relationship with work’. 
The UBI thus possesses the potential to ‘dilute the work ethic by making it easier for 
people to opt out of the labour market: to take time out between jobs, retrain, gain 
more education, care, create or simply to enjoy more leisure’ (Sage 2018:18). This, 
Sage suggests, would have the effect of blurring the boundaries between employment 
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and unemployment and create a more expansive vision of what ‘work’ can and should 
be.  
On the contemporary left this way of presenting the basic income has of late 
been superseded by another more imbued with the promise of a workless world 
potentiated by automation. As Sage notes, for these advocates UBI ‘is a means of 
maintaining social cohesion and ensuring a fair redistribution from technological 
progress’ (2018:18). Likewise, it has been contended that the UBI supports the 
reconfiguration of production and consumption by means of the nascent sharing 
economy (Srnicek and Williams 2015). Proponents argue that it could expand the 
degree of freedom within the social relations of production by providing a minimum 
means of subsistence beyond wages (Weeks 2011). Along similar lines UBI 
advocates (e.g. Mason 2015b) suggest that basic income is the answer to challenges 
of flexibilization and automation that are undermining the supply of jobs and the 
adequate remuneration for work. Yet, current evidence suggests wildly divergent 
estimates of what the future of work will look like in terms of job losses from automation 
(cf. Frey and Osborne 2013; Arntz et al 2016) . As such, creating left policy 
programmes on the assumption that we need to adjust to some already unfolding 
future rather than instead make the future adjust to our demands and desires is 
wrongheaded. It is likely that the future of work that awaits will, as in previous 
iterations, turn out to be much more like the past and the present than the future after 
all. Hence it might be noted that at least one part of the whole ‘problem representation’ 
on which UBI  is premised presents solutions to a problem that is by no means certain 
to begin with .  
Left proposals for UBI also pose the measure as a solution to the problem of 
the crisis of the state qua social democracy. To some advocates the UBI represents a 
left attempt to reduce the exposure of the state to welfare expenditure at a time of 
declining public trust. By ensuring that ‘all citizens have a minimum income’, the UBI 
would ‘eliminate the need for unpopular, stigmatising and costly to administer means-
tested payments’ (Leime and Street 2017:479). And, ‘[s]ince [it] is lifelong, it replaces 
not only state pensions but most other state benefits’. Hence it is championed as a 
‘simple to operate and to receive’ alternative to the ‘current benefit traps that act as 
disincentives to work’ (Ginn 2012:712-3), whilst also circumnavigating the crisis of 
legitimacy afflicting the social democratic state. 
As well as inspiring wider critiques in the name of a labourist or socialist politics 
(Zamora 2017, Jäger 2018), these approaches to the UBI have raised criticisms from 
those for whom work is imbued with a particular meaning or dignity (Cruddas and 
Kibasi 2016). Along these lines there are three mainstream social democratic 
arguments against the UBI, based on the work ethic, contributory principles and class 
struggle. Some opponents of the basic income frame their objections in terms of the 
dignity of labour, the loss of identity gained through work, and the erosion of a 
contributory principle contained in the sense of receiving something for nothing. These 
objections to the UBI, whilst suggestive of the danger of liquidating labour struggles, 
mirror the parallel obsessions of the UBI’s proponents, seeing a world in which work 
sits at the centre of everything, without considering how the compulsion to sell one’s 
labour power is the symptom of a wider set of social relations grounded as much in 
reproduction as production. Indeed, much of the debate on the UBI circulates around 
work and work alone.  
More convincing and central to our argument here is a third objection made by 
critics of UBI, particularly in the labour movement, who point out that workers would 
lose the capacity to resist capital that is granted by their ability to provide or withdraw 
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labour (Cruddas and Kibasi 2016). Along similar lines, other critics have asserted that 
it would set up a direct relationship between individuals and the state as wage payer, 
liquidating the point of conflict between worker and employer in and beyond the sphere 
of production (Dinerstein and Pitts 2018). Some left-wing advocates suggest that the 
UBI could have a liberating or decommodifying effect that increased the bargaining 
power of labour (Torry 2018). But this is not a question purely of relationships at work 
but rather contestation over the form of money itself, and the better or worse mediation 
of antagonisms by and with the state.  
Perspectives both for and against the basic income tend to support or oppose 
it largely by reference to its effect on work, whether bemoaning its erosion or 
celebrating the liberation from it. In this both sides of the debate miss the implication 
of work within a wider set of social relations centring on the totality of social 
reproduction as the reproduction of labour-power. Seeing work at the centre of all 
social relations elides the circumstances of social reproduction that make work a 
necessity to begin with. The critical Marxism delineated above shows that, whilst UBI 
claims to offer new routes for subsistence, by retaining the rule of money it implies that 
we would still have to secure the things we need as commodities and private property. 
This implies in turn the dispossession that continually guarantees the ‘double freedom’ 
through which we have to work at all. By focusing on the escape from work as the 
crucial step needed to break with the present in a progressive way, proponents of the 
UBI associate capitalism with a particular kind or arrangement of labour, to which all 
that matters is a politics centred on work and either its maintenance or escape. But, 
by looking at social reproduction through the lens of the social form, we can see its 
imbrication in a wider set of relations and their mediations, the contradictions and 
antagonisms inherent in which the basic income addresses only incompletely.  
Changes in work or in the workplace do not exhaust the topic on an underlying 
theoretical level, and, for all austerity and other factors have inhibited the capacity of 
humans to socially reproduce themselves and others as labour-power, this marks only 
the exacerbation of an underlying state of crisis, antagonism and contradiction not 
incidental to capitalist society but constitutive of it. What the synthesis of social form 
and social reproduction theory presented above suggests is that, in posing solutions 
to intractable problems, current proposals for the UBI fail to work from and through 
these contradictions 
In the remainder of this section we draw upon the critical resources theories of 
social form and social reproduction offer in the critical delineation of alternatives to the 
basic income by scrutinising two other ‘universalising’ proposals sometimes posed as 
substitutes or complements to the UBI by left policymakers: Universal Basic 
Services (Social Prosperity Network 2017) and Universal Basic 
Infrastructure (Industrial Strategy Commission 2017). Do these more adequately 
address the pervasive crisis of social reproduction and its formal mediation in and 
through labour, money and state? If the UBI represents an ‘abstract universal’, forcing 
particularity and difference into dominating forms of premature identity under free 
money and an even more powerful state, are other options available, closer in spirit 
to what we might call ‘concrete universals’, that seek to capture and not cleanse the 
world of specificity and contradiction? 
Universal Basic Services (UBS), was developed in 2017 by academics 
at the Social Prosperity Network (SPN) at University College London’s Institute for 
Global Prosperity. UBS is a proposal to take the provision of certain necessities out of 
the commodity sphere and provide them free of charge to anyone who needs or wants 
them. Applied to a UK context, the SPN report proposes to extend the free status of 
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healthcare, education and legal/democratic rights to four additional basic services 
provided to citizens for free, shelter, food, transport, and information so as to fulfil the 
public objectives of safety, opportunity and participation (Percy 2017:11).   
For instance, the report’s proposal for the UK suggests £13bn expenditure on 
new social housing at zero rent, £4bn on free meals for 2.2m households in food 
insecurity, £5bn on the extension of the free bus pass scheme to people of all ages, 
and £20bn on making phone, internet and the TV licence free for all (Percy 2017:11-
12). Taking basic needs out of commodified relations and overcoming the crisis of 
‘access’ to basic needs beyond the realm of waged work, the UBS revives the 
relevance and scope of state provision not only to ensure equitable access, but to 
enable economies of scale.   
The problem UBS proposes to address is conceived by its proponents along 
economic and political axes. In the economic sphere, the sharp rise in earnings 
inequality owes principally to technological change. Increased 
manufacturing productivity displaces from production employees with easily-
automatable skills, favouring those with analytical and cognitive skills suited to new 
information technologies. This has created, the UBS report suggests, an hourglass job 
market characterised by job creation at the top and bottom ends of the income scale, 
albeit with rising wages at the top and falling wages below (Portes 2017:18-
19). Meanwhile, in the political sphere, support for redistributive tax and benefit 
policies capable of addressing some of this fallout from technological change has 
declined. 
UBS proponents arguably have a more realistic appraisal of the fallout from 
technological change than many UBI advocates. The SPN report suggests that ‘may 
be that automation simply functions to displace workers from one type of low-skilled 
employment to another, resulting in increased insecurity without any gain in wages or 
productivity’ (Portes 2017:20). This trend bodes ill for the political feasibility of 
redistributive measures to address inequalities sparked by automation, of which UBI 
is one. The returns on any productivity gains from automation will likely go to those 
with ‘scarce inputs’ and skills who can command a higher wage. But this scarcity 
implies a smaller subsection of people on which to place a greater tax burden, and an 
attendant decrease in the capacity of the state to finance ongoing public expenditure 
on redistribution through the tax system.  
Whilst its assessment of some of the technological dynamics purported to 
necessitate the measure might differ, UBS is nonetheless inspired by the UBI (Moore 
2017:5). Indeed, some proposals include a UBI component. The report suggests that 
UBS and UBI can be ‘complementary’ insofar as the latter assumes the provision of 
social welfare services and the former the possibility that some kind of 
monetary provision may be necessary to allow some citizens an active part in society 
(Percy 2017:13). However, under the UBS model proposed by the SPN report, the 
UBI would only be £20 per week, so hardly at the level of subsistence proposed by 
some advocates of a basic income (2017:51-2).   
Indeed, it might be said that the UBS can be considered as an alternative to the 
UBI. As suggested above, the UBI insufficiently confronts the conditions that separate 
individuals from the means of social reproduction in the first place. But in a more direct 
way than the UBI, UBS sets out to address head-on what the SPN report refers to 
as ‘the difference between the cost of basic living and available income’ (Moore 
2017:6). Spending on basic services, as opposed to giving money to citizens 
themselves, ‘dramatically reduces the cost of basic living for those on the lowest 
incomes.’ The provision of ‘housing, food, communications and transport,’ on top 
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of some of the existing basic provision of healthcare and education free at the point of 
use, is ‘far more effective at driving down the cost of living than spending the same 
money on existing services, or on redistribution,’ such as that effectively posited in 
conceptualisations of the UBI. Taking subsistence goods and services out of the 
commodity sphere potentiates the overcoming of the separation from the independent 
individual or collective means of living on which social domination in capitalist society 
logically and historically rests. That being said, the UBS does not address child care 
or care for the elderly. Thus by overlooking the essential role of free reproductive care 
work in society, it does not address one of the core systemic contradictions that 
triggers the structural cause of the crisis of social reproduction at large. Moreover, this 
terrain of material social relations is still mediated through the state, a social form 
within which the separation UBS promises to overcome is negative-dialectically 
concealed as a logical and historical presupposition of its very existence as such. 
There is, on the other hand, only an incomplete break made with the mediation 
of subsistence by money. Whilst some goods and services would be stripped of their 
monetary character in what  the report’s authors present as the move from a ‘primarily 
redistributive model for social security to a primarily service-oriented model’ (Percy 
2017:10), UBS would, even where ‘replac[ing] much of the current conditional benefits 
system […] also preserv[e] the value of remuneration.’ To this extent, the wage form 
is retained. But in preserving the role of the wage it bears the considerable merit of not 
simply proposing to conceal the social relations on which it centres within the 
universality of a direct state payment to facilitate the reproduction of labour-power, as 
is the case with the UBI. Indeed, UBS, its proponents claim, overcomes problems 
associated with other options like the UBI by ‘satisfying differentiated needs,’ and 
garnering political acceptability through its incremental affordability. In this sense, even 
while‘preserving the intrinsic value of monetary reward for contribution’ it at least 
maintains the ‘room to move’ of the antagonistic social relations negative-dialectically 
concealed within the wage as a form of mediation (see Marx 1976:198; Pitts, Jean and 
Clarke, forthcoming; Dinerstein and Pitts 2018). 
That being said, UBS sets itself apart from the pursuit of higher wages as 
the principal means through which the struggle for better standards of living 
progresses. UBS is presented as an alternative to a higher minimum wage because 
the latter ‘only reduces poverty if it is set high, and if it is high work will be decreased, 
compliance reduced and/or prices raised.’ UBS, on the other hand, in effect increases 
the amount of the existing wage workers are able to keep by decommodifying services 
so that people do not have to spend their hard-earned cash on them. 
This decommodifying purpose sets it apart from the UBI, whilst still achieving the 
outcome desired by proponents of the UBI insofar as it would make underpaid and 
undervalued marginal activities essential to economy and society both viable and 
sustainable to perform. The difference is that the UBS ‘meets needs more directly’ 
than the UBI.  
As suggested above, it does so by addressing poverty as a question of access 
to necessities as opposed to simply granting more money with which to acquire them. 
It thereby focuses on the opportunities created by the right material conditions rather 
than the outcome of having an equal amount of money, and encourages the 
construction of a new civil society of collective assets through which these 
opportunities can be realised (Portes 2017:24). As such, rather than emptying out the 
‘institutional fabric’ between citizen and state – as some suggest UBI does (Dinerstein 
and Pitts 2018) – the SPN report proposes that “UBS require social institutions and 
support the development of public service infrastructure’ (Percy 2017:14). In this way, 
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where the basic income “arguably does little or nothing […] to reverse social 
atomisation, UBS could be ‘pro-social;’ publicly provided services are a visible 
collective good, and both providing them and consuming them is at least in part a 
social activity’ (Portes 2017:24). In this way it may chart a route of struggle through 
the social form of the state more effectively than the UBI which liquidates struggle with 
an abstractly universal view of the relationship between individual subsistence, state 
and money. 
To some extent UBS resonates with another ‘universal’ approach to the key 
political-economic challenges of the age: Universal Basic Infrastructure (UBIS). This 
concept is presented in the Industrial Strategy Commission (2017) report to the 
government, its leading proponent the economist Diane Coyle (Coyle and Macfarlane 
2018). The problem UBIS proposes to solve is that the UK sustains a severe lack of 
investment in infrastructure. For the ISC report’s authors, ‘investment in new 
technologies and their diffusion’ requires improvements in the UK’s currently ‘weak’ 
hard infrastructure in areas like rail, energy, fixed and mobile broadband and fibre, and 
electric and autonomous vehicles (ISC 2018:50). Moreover, the UK’s soft 
infrastructure, i.e. ‘investment in human capital through universal education and health 
and social care services’ is not properly funded in the current political conditions and 
as such weakens living standards and ‘economic potential’. The current lack of these 
kinds of infrastructural components reduces the UK’s propensity to attract the most 
innovative and productive global firms.   
The UBIS thus responds to deficits in both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ infrastructure on the 
basis that it will improve work and economic life in the contemporary UK. Proposals 
for a UBI make similar claims vis-à-vis the requirement to adjust to a new age of 
technological innovation and disruption. But, for the authors of the UBIS report, the 
basic income may give recipients money, but does not provide opportunities to ‘buy a 
transport network or high-quality education system for their town or city,’ which would 
offer increased opportunities for better work and life (ISC 2018:50). The UBI is an 
individualised payment with no collective component around which to construct new 
civil society institutions and infrastructures sitting between citizen and state. It is, 
as Diane Coyle states, an individual response to collective problems (Coyle and 
Macfarlane 2018): 
 
Whenever there’s fear about automation destroying lots of jobs, the idea of 
basic income comes back into fashion. And for me it doesn’t go far enough. It 
is an individual solution to collective problems, because if you’re given an 
income, never mind that it’s not going to be a particularly large one, there’s a 
lot you can’t do with your own individual income. I couldn’t take my money out 
and make sure the roads get mended, or that there’s a good public transport 
system, or there are good schools for my children to go to. So the idea of 
Universal Basic Infrastructure is that you give people everywhere agency by 
giving them the assets to make what they want of their lives. So this includes 
soft infrastructure but you make sure there’s a minimum standard at their 
school, a minimum standard in healthcare, the connectivity they need, the 
transport they need to travel and work wherever they want to.  
 
Universal Basic Services, and its close relative Universal Basic 
Infrastructure, represent alternatives to UBI. They mitigate some issues and break the 
individualising link with money inherent in the UBI. In so doing they address, although 
not without caveats related for instance to the lack of care services, much more directly 
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the constrained basis of individual and collective reproduction that characterises 
capitalist social relations. They also retain layers of civil society mediating the 
relationship between the individual and the state, rather than the isolating dependence 
upon individuals and the state as wage payer of first resort. UBS and UBIS may 
therefore empower social actors without implying to quite such a degree their 
individual subservience to money or the state, keeping open to a much greater 
extent the possibility of struggle for alternatives that gesture towards other kinds 
of society. That is, of course, notwithstanding the presence of a number of problems 
that, returning to the theoretical underpinning of the paper in an analysis of social form 
and social reproduction, we return to in the concluding section. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As Sage notes (2018:17-18), UBI is ‘an old idea cutting across the political divide’, 
which is gaining ‘momentum in many advanced welfare states’. We would argue that 
the slightest brush with reality reveals UBI not to be over-optimistically utopian, but 
rather not utopian enough, insofar as it is increasingly seen as a measure necessary 
to ensure the stability of capitalist society. Whilst the UBI is suggested by some on the 
left who desire a radical reimagining of how we relate to work and wealth, it is also 
suggested, sometimes with a  greater degree of plausibility, by those on the pro-
market right as a means by which the contradictions of contemporary capitalism can 
be smoothed over and the continuity of life, consumption and commodification 
guaranteed (Wolf 2014). 
Given the growing support for UBI across political and class divides, and in the 
context of its likelihood as a possible future measure implemented as much to save as 
to subvert capitalism, this paper is a warning about the need to link universalizing left 
policy within a more grounded theoretical and empirical understanding of capitalist 
social relations. What is most lacking is a sophisticated systematic theory of what 
binds and undergirds work and economic life in capitalist society, and how the space 
can be kept open for active struggle in pursuit of alternatives. The theory of social 
reproduction, twinned with a critique of capitalist social forms, provides the basis for 
such a systematization. 
Our contribution is to open the debate about what the nature of the society the 
UBI helps survive or bring into being will be. We have suggested that UBS and UBIS 
pose alternatives or complements to the UBI that might serve to address some of the 
concerns we have raised here. However, both UBS and UBIS still ultimately argue 
for top-down support from the state without necessarily building any real capacity for 
collective action, collective organisation and collective struggle from the bottom up. 
Without keeping open the frayed ends of class struggle, they depend upon the abstract 
social forms of which capitalist society is constituted – not so much on money as in 
the UBI, but certainly the state as itself a form of capitalist social relations funded by 
expanded wealth and profit. In common with UBI, these ‘universal’ demands are all 
addressed within individual nation states, suggesting as such that this ‘universality’ is 
limited to an identifiable, unanimous ‘people’ that could be all to easily identified with 
nativist projects of national renewal.   
Both UBS and UBIS propose non-monetary ways past the impasses of 
the UBI. But all the same they retain a link with capitalist social forms of money and 
state that may serve to close rather than open the path to real alternatives. In pursuit 
of the latter the contradictions they seek to address might best be mediated through 
more bottom-up, struggle-based means of addressing the manifold crises of work, 
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wage and social democracy that undergird them.  Any alternative would also enable 
experiments and alternatives in how we reproduce ourselves apart from them, freeing 
us from reliance upon the existing system, collectively and individually. It would 
mediate the social relations through new forms and modes of existence rather than 
through labour, money and the state as we know them today. This would leave open 
the dynamic tensions around work and welfare in contemporary capitalism without 
promise of their incomplete resolution in the name of a false universality unattainable 
in a world characterised by antagonism, domination and crisis. Without a much wider 
set of interventions and struggles, a critical Marxist perspective on social form and 
social reproduction suggests that a social policy of abstractly universal alternatives to 
the current state of things may just as well mean still more of the same. 
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